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ABSTRACT
Ihde’s project is an intellectual challenge with elements of hard technological determinism. Apart from
different accounts of hard technological determinism in the literature of philosophy of technology, it
can be regarded as a view that focuses on determination of a certain direction by using given
technological artifacts regardless of other forces and contexts. At the cultural level, it means a single,
massive trajectory happens by the rise of high-technological culture and its attainment as a world
culture. I believe that Ihde’s project cannot be fully understood unless one thinks about its challenge
while keeping in mind this meaning of technological determinism. This is what this paper aims to
pursue, namely the description and evaluation of his challenge with technological determinism. The
paper has six interconnected sections. After an introduction, in Section 2, I will explore
“postphenomenology”, which is Ihde’s philosophical and intellectual approach toward humantechnology relations. In Section 3, I will emphasize Ihde’s challenges with the elements of
technological determinism. In addition, because of the relation of technological determinism and
technological ethics, I will try to illustrate normative aspects of Ihde’s project in Section 4. Then, I will
show the intellectual dialogue between Ihde and Heidegger in Section 5. In summary, Sections 4 and 5
will show some consequences of Ihde’s confrontation with technological determinism that will be
developed in Section 3. Finally, Section 6 focuses on a critical evaluation of Ihde’s dialogue with
technological determinism. In this section, my main emphasis is making some distinctions to decrease
the analytical deficiencies of Ihde’s project on hard technological determinism.
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1. An Overview: Ihde’s Contribution in the Philosophy of Technology
The philosophy of technology is an emerging discipline whose roots date back to Martin Heidegger’s
tools analysis in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1927). In this book, Heidegger originally and creatively
establishes a kind of hermeneutics of “human-tool relations” in which a clear distinction between two
modes of being, two distinct relations of human-tool, are explored. For Heidegger, Zuhandenheit (ready
to hand) and Vorhandenheit (present at hand) are two distinct modes of being in the world with their
own specific features. According to Heidegger, Zuhandenheit is a “mode of being in the world" that
shows itself in practice. For example, when one utilizes a hammer to hit a nail, the Zuhandenheit is
constituted; the hammer is used to (in order to) do something. Regarding Heidegger’s phenomenology
in this example, the resulting function is pushing a nail; the hammer is not a “thing”, rather it is a mode
of being in the world used in order to do something. The Zuhandenheit is defined as the function of a
tool which is designed in order to do something (Heidegger, 1927/2010, pp. 69-71). At this level, a
thing appears as “equipment” (tool). Further, let us consider the outcome of a situation where there is
an issue during the process of hammering (i.e. the handle breaking). In this situation, the relation of
Vorhandenheit is formed. For Heidegger, the first relation with tools is an authentic one that is practiceoriented and context-oriented. On the other hand, Vorhandenheit is a theoretical relation that places
tools outside of their usual context and occurs when the traditional utility of the tool fails in some way
(Zimmerman, 1990, pp. 139-141).
By comparing these two relations, Heidegger shows that the Zuhandenheit relation ontologically is
prioritized over the Vorhandenheit relation, namely, practice precedes theory in our real lives. The
ontological primacy of Zuhandenheit over Vorhandenheit means that Zuhandenheit is an authentic
mode we live within the usual life. Meanwhile the second relation occurs when the context and
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wholeness of “ready to hand” relations are obstructed or impeded.1 This is one important aspect of “the
practical turn” in the history of philosophy that is a central concept for Ihde.
Don Ihde is profoundly influenced by this new approach toward “human-tool” relationships. He sees
Heidegger’s tool analysis (ontological primacy of Zuhandenheit over Vorhandenheit) as the practical
turn in the history of philosophy.2 For Ihde, the practical turn occurs when the priority of Zuhandenheit
over Vorhandenheit is identified.3 Ihde’s project expands upon, but is not restricted by, this traditional
notion. For example, in Technology and the Lifeworld (1990), Ihde demonstrates the main elements of
Heidegger’s tools analysis and includes many case studies to show the practical turn in the history of
philosophy.
Borrowing Mitcham’s famous distinction in the philosophy of technology, Heidegger is a
“humanities philosopher of technology”, one who is against the “engineering philosophy of
technology”. A humanities philosopher of technology focuses on the primacy of the humanities over
technologies and emphasizes interpretative efforts to understand the essence of Technology (Mitcham,
1994).4 According to Mitcham, an “engineering philosopher of technology” prefers the primacy of
technologies over humanities and case studies about technologies instead of thinking about the essence
of Technology. In this context, Mitcham reasons that Heidegger seeks an ontology for technologies.
Further, Mitcham believes that Heidegger is not appreciative and/or optimistic in his approach to

1

. I will further explore the philosophical relations between Heidegger and Ihde in Section 5. What I wrote here is my
reading of (Heidegger 1927/2010, pp. 68-95) and (Olsen et al. 2008, pp. 65-70).
2
. In Section 5, I will show that this primacy, for Ihde, is an ontological-historical priority.
3
. Ihde has highlighted this view in different writings. For example, see (Ihde, 2010, pp. 56-73) and (Ihde, 1979, pp. 103129).
4
. I use Technology (capital T) to remark that this approach frequently believes in one essence for technologies.
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technology and is not interested in experimental studies. Thus, these characteristics make Heidegger a
humanities philosopher of technology (pp. 39-55).5

Mitcham (1994) sees Ihde, like Dewey, as an engineering philosopher of technology. For Mitcham,
an engineering philosopher of technology is interested in the internal features of technologies, criticizes
the critics of technology, and highlights the importance of technology in human experience. This
philosophy does not consider deeply socio-political applications and focuses on technologies more than
philosophy (pp. 75-78). However, I argue that this overall picture is not correct. Ihde is at the
intersection of humanities and engineering philosophies of technology. He is interested in pragmatism,
case studies, internal characters of different technologies, and has some appreciation for the history of
technology. In addition, Ihde is a phenomenologist (or postphenomenologist as he calls it) of
technology. Therefore, Ihde is familiar with the humanistic philosophy of technology and uses its
methods and themes in his writings, and his projects are filled with elements that for Mitcham are the
humanistic and engineering philosophies of technology. In summary, unlike Mitcham’s view, I see
Ihde as both an engineering and a humanities philosopher of technology. Ihde’s philosophical dialogue
with Heidegger was originally explored in Technics and Praxis (1979), one of the first books on the
topic of the philosophy of technology in the Anglo-American philosophy canon (Albrechtslund, 2003).
As previously mentioned, Ihde’s Technology and the Lifeworld (1990) is arguably the most important
book in the field. By borrowing the “phenomenology of technology” from Husserl and Heidegger, Ihde
pursues diverse case studies, develops different thought experiments, explores the relations of
technology and culture, refers to his own experiences with technologies, rejects any utopian or

5

. We can see a summary of the subjects and current waves of philosophy of technology in (Franssen et al, 2004).

3

dystopian approach to technologies, and finally creates influential concepts and terms in the philosophy
of technology.
Besides their intellectual openness, Ihde’s writings are distinctive in the literature of the philosophy
of technology and incorporate a variety of personal experiences and stories. Ihde also refers to these
personal experiences in a way that reflects the philosophy of technology as an interpretation of his
personal life. In other words, these concrete narrations are not inconsistent with Ihde’s main
philosophical questions and projects. Additionally, he is interested in using different examples and
allegories. For example, Ihde (1990) highlights the allegory of the “Garden and Earth” to make a
distinction between a lifeworld that consists of various technologies and a lifeworld that does not (pp.
11-20). Ihde presents interesting concepts to illustrate different relationships with technology.
Particularly, Ihde introduces the concepts of embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, and background
relations to reveal how tools and technologies have different functions in different lifeworlds.6
Ihde’s approach toward the history of philosophy of technology is unique and remarkable. The first
unique feature of his project is that he is not usually interested in evaluating and criticizing other
philosophers of technology. When Ihde refers to the writings of other philosophers– such as Feenberg
(2003, 2005), Mitcham (1994), Haraway (1991), Borgmann (1984), and Dreyfus (1991, 2001) – Ihde
shows great sympathy and respect for them. The red line for Ihde exists in the practical turn in the
philosophy of technology which returns to Heidegger’s distinction between Zuhandenheit and
Vorhandenheit. Ihde even rejected Thomas Kuhn’s project, because he is unable to reconcile the
practical turn in the history of philosophy, and specifically in the philosophy of technology (Ihde,
1991a, p. 16).7 Apart from this obvious criterion, Ihde rarely has critical dialogues with other
6

. We will explore them in Section 2.
. This viewpoint will be highlighted in Sections 2 and 5.
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philosophers of technology. He is a “synthetic” philosopher who borrows what he needs from other
philosophers, but in the end can develop his own project.

What is his project? From one aspect, I suppose his project is an intellectual challenge with elements
of hard technological determinism. Apart from different accounts of hard technological determinism in
the literature of philosophy of technology, it can be regarded as a view that focuses on determination
of a certain direction by using given technological artifacts regardless of other forces and contexts
(Ihde, 1979, p. 42).8 At the cultural level, it means a single, massive trajectory happens by the rise of
high-technological culture and its attainment as a world culture (Ihde, 1990, p. 123). 9 I believe that
Ihde’s project cannot be fully understood unless one thinks about its challenge while keeping in mind
this meaning of technological determinism. This is what this paper aims to pursue. Even though I argue
that one can read the project by emphasizing other topics such as instrumental realism, sciencetechnology interactions, bodies in technologies, technoscience and so on, I will prove that without
focusing on Ihde’s dialogue about technological determinism, the other dialogues may not be
understood properly. This is what I want to do in this paper, namely the description and evaluation of
his challenge with technological determinism. My point is that the indeterministic characteristics of
Ihde’s philosophy not only starts by his postphenomenological approach, but continues by his dialogue
with technological determinism. The final position is a synthesis between these two different theses.

My paper has six interconnected sections. After this introduction, in Section 2, I will explore
“postphenomenology”, which is Ihde’s philosophical and intellectual approach toward humantechnology relations. In Section 3, I will emphasize Ihde’s challenges with the elements of

8

. I emphasized Ihde’s own reading of hard technological determinism.
. In this paper, when I speak about technological determinism and do not refer to a specific account, I mean this
definition of it.
9
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technological determinism. In addition, because of the relation of technological determinism and
technological ethics, I will try to illustrate normative aspects of Ihde’s project in Section 4. Then, I will
show the intellectual dialogue between Ihde and Heidegger in Section 5. This is necessary because Ihde
uses Heidegger’s concepts and methods to think about technologies. In summary, Sections 4 and 5 will
show some consequences of Ihde’s confrontation with technological determinism that will be
developed in Section 3. Finally, Section 6 focuses on my critical evaluation of Ihde’s dialogue with
technological determinism.

Because of this uniqueness of his project, giving a report of it is not easy. However, I intend to show
an accurate and comprehensive interpretation of Ihde’s project in four following sections. These
sections are totally descriptive and I’ll only evaluate Ihde’s project in Section 6.

6

2. Ihde’s Postphenomenology of Technology

As mentioned, Ihde has a phenomenological approach towards different technologies. In a specific
sense, he uses a postphenomenological approach that is a synthesis between phenomenology and
pragmatism. So, his postphenomenology has two parts: phenomenology and pragmatism. However, he
defends his own account of these two famous philosophical schools (Albrechtslund, 2003).
Phenomenology sees a deep correlation between humans and the world in such a way that neither can
be defined without the other. It means that phenomenology shows a correlation between what is
experienced (noema) and the way noema is experienced (noesis). For example, Husserl as the
predecessor of phenomenology, supposes that there is an interrelated relationship between noema (the
experienced object) and noesis (the way it is experienced) (Ihde, 1979, p. 4). Moreover in Heidegger’s
philosophy, “being - in - the -world” (Dasein) presupposes a relational connection between Dasein and
the world. Following Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger points out that there is a correlation
between the experience of the world and the concept of the world. We cannot imagine the world without
the experience of it, and we cannot suppose the experience of the world without the presupposition of
it (pp. 4-6). Both Husserl and Heidegger recognize an interconnected relationship between humans and
the world in which Descartes’ subjectivism totally disappears. This is the meaning of intentional
correlation (intentionality) in which the activity of perception is inextricably linked to what is perceived
(pp. 5-6).
For Ihde (1986), this subjectivism has three elements: a) The subjectivism refers to Descartes’ ego
self – closed object, b) it is worldless (except by reference or geometric method), and c) it is a subject
without object (p. 188). At one level, we can say that Husserl’s and Heidegger’s projects are opposed
to Descartes’ subjectivism, which presupposes a great gap between “subject” and “object” without

7

seeing the context of them. Because of this objection, Ihde (1998) assumes that phenomenology is an
evolutionary philosophical school in modern Western philosophy: a radical approach which rejects
fundamental presuppositions of modern philosophy, namely Descartes’ dualism of worldless object
and subject (Ihde, 1998, p. 75).10 Postphenomenology is based on this radical opposition to Descartes’
subjectivism, even though it has other features, like pragmatist ones, too.
According to Ihde (2003a), postphenomenology has several elements of pragmatism.
Postphenomenology is an account of phenomenology that focuses on its specific practical and nonfundamental elements. Postphenomenology highlights the experimental and concrete features of
phenomenology and expresses a combination of non-fundamental phenomenology and pragmatism.
Like pragmatism, postphenomenology rejects epistemological foundationalism, namely, it does not
accept that all knowledge or justified belief ultimately rests on a foundation of noninferential
knowledge or justified belief. Postphenomenology is not interested in these epistemological kinds of
topics at all (p. 24). Ihde (2003b) supposes that this approach is also viewed in pragmatism. For Ihde,
postphenomenology, unlike classical phenomenology, does not cover merely epistemological
questions, but rather considers the concrete practices and case studies for knowing our relations with
the world (pp. 24-25).11 In this context, technology is not an applied science: science is a theoretical
technology. This means that the practice of technology is in the center of postphenomenological
explorations. Specifically, postphenomenology of technology takes the practical turn in modern
philosophy seriously. These are some features which make a distinction between the theory–oriented,

10

. Ihde (1977) writes, “Phenomenology as a relatively new philosophical method claims to be a radical way of thought.
Its founder, Edmund Husserl, claimed, “There is only one radical self investigation, and it is phenomenological. Martin
Heidegger, following Husserl, claimed, “Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and
it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology is ontology possible” (p. 17).
11
. In addition, see (Selinger, 2006, p. 9).
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foundational phenomenology and postphenomenology. Postphenomenology of technics and artifacts
begins in this context.
At one level, Ihde’s contribution to the literature of phenomenology is his thoughts about the relations
between humans and technologies in a world that is fully occupied with different artifacts and
technologies. He focuses on claiming that tools and artifacts have always been vital features of humanworld relations. Unlike the exceptional cases such as “the skinny dip of childhood”, “intimate sexual
relations”, and “walking barefoot under the moon”, our lives are totally interwoven with different
technologies. Ihde (1990) writes that our relations with different technologies began when Adam and
Eve were cast out of the Garden of Eden (p. 15). In this framework, he introduces three programs:
program one (a phenomenology of technics), program two (cultural hermeneutics), and program three
(technology and lifeworld). The first program is a micro project, the second is a macro project, and the
third is an analysis of our living in a world that has been saturated by image-technologies (pp. 72-191).
What are these projects? I will discuss them in the following parts.
2.1. Program One: A Phenomenology of Technics

As I have mentioned, Ihde (1979) thinks that phenomenology is the “science of experience,” but this
does not mean that phenomenology exists in the paradigm of modern sciences (Ihde, 1977, p. 21).12
Phenomenology is a radical reaction toward science (p. xvii). According to Ihde (1990), its main focus
is the relation of the human experiencer to the field of experience (p. 25). How does this relation
happen? Intentionality plays an essential role here. Intentionality is a key term that connects “the way
perception constitutes” (noesis) and “what is perceived” (noema). The way we perceive is totally linked
to what is perceived and vice versa. For Ihde, the movement from noesis to noema constitutes the first

12

. I described this meaning in the introduction of this section of my paper.
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program, and the movement from noema to the noesis constitutes program two. Program one focuses
on the experience of the world, and program two emphasizes the concept of the world. Because of these
definitions, the first and second programs are defined respectively as sensory and cultural levels (pp.
21-24).
At the micro level (sensory), Ihde highlights four distinct relations: embodiment, hermeneutic,
alterity, and background. We drive cars, speak on phones, use glasses, listen to music with speakers,
type on keyboards, read thermostats, and so on. Ihde thinks that we can order phenomenological
descriptions of all these usual activities with these four types of relations.
Technologies mediate the relation between humans and the world. In this context, the embodiment
relation regards technologies as parts of bodily perceptions. Ihde borrows this term from Merleau-Ponty
who uses the “embodiment of perception” to describe human–artifact relations. Like Merleau-Ponty
for Ihde (1990), this is called the “embodiment relation” because technologies act as the extensions of
our perceptual and bodily senses. The main idea is that when artifacts work as the extensions of our
perceptions and bodies, they are parts of our bodies (pp. 71-77). Merleau-Ponty (1945/2005) uses the
example of a blind man’s cane (which extends his body), while Ihde uses the example of glasses (which
extend someone’s sight) (p. 165). We wear glasses and we see the world through them. In this situation,
we do not see these glasses when they are working properly, instead we see the world through them. In
this sense, glasses become maximally “transparent.” This transparency of glasses is the material
condition of embodiment. This point means that they refer to other things--not to themselves. Without
this transparency, these kinds of artifacts do not work properly. Ihde (1990) mentions that it is important
that embodiment relations are not limited to visual relations: hearing aids have this function for the
hearing impaired, and canes have this function for the blind. Heidegger’s prominent example,
hammering, may be understood in this context as well. A hammer, when working properly, extends our
10

bodily perceptions. Therefore, in this context, artifacts are regarded as parts of our bodily perceptions
and may extend all human senses (pp. 72-74).13
Based on this phenomenology of technology, our bodily perceptions are not only extended but are
also changed by technologies. The phenomenological principle mentions that noema and noesis are
interconnected. So a change in the way an object is experienced causes a change in the experienced
object and vice versa. Wearing glasses changes the way we see the world (noesis), therefore, the
perceived object (noema) changes (Ihde, 1979, pp. 7-11).14
The second relation (hermeneutic) is based on reading instrumental artifacts. Unlike the embodiment
relations where a combination of “I and technologies” has specific connections with the world, in
hermeneutic relations, “I” has a relation to a combination of “technologies and the world”. This means
that artifacts in these relations are parts of the world and not parts of “I” (Ihde, 1990, pp. 80-82). The
most important difference between the first relations and the second ones is that in hermeneutic
relations, technologies are not transparent. Ihde’s purpose in describing these relations as
“hermeneutic” is to remind us that instead of extending our bodily perceptions, artifacts can be read to
say something about the world. For example, when we read a blueprint that represents a building, the
blueprint is a part of a building and illustrates one aspect of it. Therefore, unlike the case of glasses, a
blueprint is not transparent, it is what must be read to refer to a building. Ihde (1990) thinks, in
embodiment relations, the focus is on the relations between “I” and “artifact”, whereas the main
question in hermeneutic relations is what the relation of an “artifact” is to “the world”. This is what
Ihde calls the enigma position. In embodiment relations, the enigma position is between “I” and
“artifacts”. The question is how they relate to one another; for example, how do eyeglasses change our

13

. In addition, see (Achterhuis, 2001, pp. 123-126).
. I will discuss it more in the second program.

14

11

sensory perceptions? Moreover, the enigma in hermeneutic relations is the relation between
“technologies” and “the world”. When we read the temperature of our room with a thermostat, the key
point (enigma position) is how this thermostat relates to the temperature and how the thermostat works
(pp. 85-88).
For Ihde, hermeneutic relations transform our perceptions, but there is one difference between the
transformation of perception in embodiment relations and in hermeneutic ones. The transformation in
hermeneutic relations is higher with more contrast. To clarify the meaning of transformation and
contrast consider that the world that eyeglasses see strongly resembles the world as seen by the eyes,
whereas the transformation of perception when reading a spectrogram (as an artifact which transfers
light beams to graphs in hermeneutic relations) is totally different; it is a transformation of high contrast.
A spectrogram provides information about a star’s chemical composition by visually representing its
light beams. It represents a star’s light beams with graphs to provide information about the chemical
compositions of that star. The nature and quality of this transformation is different from the
transformation of the world through glasses. In the case of glasses, we perceive the world more clearly.
In contrast, in hermeneutic relations we experience the world in a totally different way; we see the
graphs instead of a star’s chemical composition. Therefore, we have a spectrum in which movement
from embodiment relations to hermeneutic ones increases the contrast between the world without
artifacts and the world with them.
In the third relation, alterity, technology is regarded as an “other” (or quasi other) world which shows
itself in the world.15 It seems weird that we see artifacts as “others”. Ihde (1990) invites us to leave our
“common sense” understanding of artifacts to grasp the meaning of this account of technological

15

. This relation was not mentioned in Ihde (1979) and was explored clearly in Ihde (1990).
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relations. In this relation, we are not related to the world through artifacts; we are connected to
technologies, so technologies are “others” or “quasi-others” for us that put the world in the background.
With regard to the otherness of domestic animals, Ihde regards this relation as a quasi-other one because
it is stronger than mere objectness but weaker than the otherness of domestic animals. Here,
technologies are like us. The most significant examples of the alterity relation are human–AI relations.
In this example, AI is similar to humans (i.e. computers have similar intelligence to human beings).
Ihde believes that our relations with robots, toys, and cars are other examples of alterity relations. My
favorite example is Apple’s ‘Siri’ which works as an intelligent person: it answers questions, makes
recommendations, and allocates requests to Internet services. In an alterity relation, I have a direct
relation with artifacts and see them as others. The world is in the background. Unlike embodiment
relations (in which artifacts are transparent), and hermeneutic relations (in which artifacts refer to the
world with more contrast than embodiment relations), in alterity relations artifacts can be experienced
clearly. Artifacts, as independent others, are the foreground and quasi-other and we engage with them
momentarily (pp. 96-100). The transparency of this relation is very low because the focal point is an
artifact. According to Ihde, there is a ratio between the transparency and objectness of technology.
Unlike an embodiment relation, here the objectness is low (technology is quasi-other), so, transparency
is low as well (p. 108).
Ihde (1990) supposes that background relations, as the fourth and final relations, illustrate technology
as part of the context by insulating humans from their external environments. We see that the role of
artifacts in hermeneutic relations and alterity relations is dominant. Technologies are focal points that
put the world in the background. However, in background relations, technologies are parts of
backgrounds. Phenomenologically, the function of technology in this relation is different from
transparency and opacity in the other relations.

13

How do they work? They totally change this

background. By changing the context of our perceptions, technologies shape them. One of Ihde’s many
examples for this relation is a building’s central heating system. These systems cannot be perceived by
our perceptions clearly, instead we may perceive a “white noise” (p. 109). Like the case of embodiment
relations, technologies in background relations only show themselves when they do not work properly.
Only in this situation, do we see them clearly (Ihde, 1979, pp. 13-15). Technologies in these relations
“do not call for focal attention” when they do their regular functions. Other examples of background
relations are appliances in a kitchen, automated and semi-automatic machines, lighting systems,
spacecraft, submarines, shelter technologies, clothing, and all artifacts that create a distance between
us and the world (insulate humans from external environments). By mentioning “clothing” and other
technologies, Ihde even reminds us that they are not restricted to modern artifacts (Ihde, 1990, p. 109).
As we have seen, Ihde refers to automation to elaborate upon the features of artifacts in this relation.
Artifacts here shape the background by their automated nature.
These four human-technology relations have a crucial role in Ihde’s philosophy of technology.
Specifically, he refers to them to develop his projects against two dominant doctrines: technological
determinism, and social determinism. They show the diversity of human-technology relations as well
as the non-neutral feature of technologies (the way our perceptions are changed by technologies).
However, this project is developed at the sensory level and will be completed when he explores humantechnology relations at the macro level.
2.2. Program Two: Cultural Hermeneutics

The second program is developed at the cultural level. The main point at the second level is that cultures
are connected to technologies in various ways and these connections create a diversity.
Phenomenological multistability shows four human-technology relations at the experimental level and
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illustrates this diversity at the cultural level. Both say human–world relations have a kind of multistable
nature. This means that these relations are based on an ambiguous structure: an essential ambiguity.
The practice of a phenomenologist is to describe the relations by focusing on specific variations to
grasp the structure of these relations. As Ihde mentions, the professional duty of a phenomenologist is
“the exploration of variations in order to discover invariants and structures of this ambiguity” (Ihde,
1990, pp. 108-110). Technologies comprise different meanings by various usages in diverse cultures
and contexts. This ambiguity leads to four relations at the micro level and guides us to cultural diversity
at the macro-level (pp. 108-110).
Ihde’s aim is to represent a framework which goes beyond technological determinism and social
determinism. Impacts of artifacts on culture, and vice versa, have been one of the main concerns of
social sciences and humanities. Ihde, as a philosopher of technology, thinks about these as well. In this
context, Ihde realizes two philosophical alternatives for his phenomenological projects on culture–
technology relations: technological determinism and social determinism. Social determinism
(instrumentalism) presumes that technologies are mere neutral tools for human ends. On the other hand,
technological determinism (essentialism) sees technology as including an independent essence that
changes and shapes the culture (Achterhuis, 2001, p. 133). Ihde rejects both approaches. For him,
technology is always related to humans. Technologies are technologies when they do something in
relation to humans. Referring to the Lockean terminology, I can say that Ihde believes that there is not
any nominal essence for technologies in these relations. When phenomenology starts to explore the
structure of technologies, the “essence of technology” will be neglected. In this context, it is a vague
concept. Technologies have an essence only when the relations stop. Therefore, essentialism is rejected
by this approach. In addition, technologies in human-technology relations are not neutral because they
change the structure of these relations. In summary, the instrumental intentionality in human15

technologies relations, at cultural levels, is neither neutral nor has a deterministic structure. So, he
claims both social determinism and technological determinism are rejected by postphenomenology at
the cultural level.
Even though Ihde (1990) thinks about the rejection of social determinism, his main concern at the
cultural level is the rejection of technological determinism. Ihde regards hard technological
determinism as “the notion of an overall trajectory to technological history” (p. 124). One aspect of this
technological determinism is the dominance of Western-originated science and technology: Is this
dominance “fate” for the entire earth? (p. 124). As I mentioned, Ihde’s answer to this question is clear:
technologies are ambiguous objects which are embedded in different cultures by the new relations
cultures and technologies create. This means that a dual interaction happens between technology and
culture. Culture, which consists of values and practices, gives meaning to technology by forming
diverse technology-culture relations. On the other hand, the meaning of a culture depends on the
function of technology in technology – culture relations. The plurality of technological connections
with cultures, in non-neutral indeterministic relations, is totally against hard technological determinism.
This means that there is no overall trajectory to technological history.
Many examples have been mentioned by Ihde to illustrate the cultural aspects of technologies in
different contexts. One of them is the example of a “clock” and its own historical-cultural functions in
various cultures. Ihde (1990) emphasizes the functions of a “clock” in Western culture and Chinese
history. By referring to some historical research, he writes that ancient Chinese civilizations “were
highly developed in their knowledge of astronomy or ‘heavenly’ phenomena” (p. 129). Ihde thinks
these phenomena are totally different from the mechanical movements of the stars introduced by
Western cultures. Founded on various functions that “clock” has in Western cultures and ancient
Chinese civilizations, we see different human–clock relations in these two cultural domains. In Western
16

culture, the passage of time is related to the mechanical movement of the clock’s hands, while in ancient
Chinese civilizations the movement of the hands is related to the movement of the heavens. However,
this does not mean that technology is totally passive and neutral in these relations. It has an inclination
that affects culture. Based on this inclination, one artifact has two different meanings because of being
in two different relations in two cultures (p. 130).
For Ihde, this example shows the wrong presuppositions of hard technological determinism. First
of all, technology’s function is “in order to” do something in different contexts; technological
determinism ignores technological relations with different cultures. It sees technology as an essence
separate from the relations. “Is this essence real or nominal from a Lockean perspective?” has not been
answered in Ihde’s postphenomenology. Ihde could mention that it is a vague question in his
postphenomenology.16 Secondly, technological determinism ignores the active function of culture to

. Based on the importance of ‘human–technology relations’ in Ihde’s postphenomenology, I think he could introduce
‘relational essence' as a term which is totally compatible with his postphenomenology. As I mentioned, his main concern is
the rejection of an 'essence' that is related to the pre-phenomenological subjectivism which was introduced by Descartes
and developed by Lock, Hume, Kant and etc. In this context, positively, he has different strategies to neglect 'categorical
essence' (in Lockean sense). One way is focusing on the 'variation method’. This concept can clearly show the
differences between ‘categorical essence’ (and real one) and his view. According to Ihde, this method refers to
different variations to find out the 'invariant features’ of relations. Borrowing from Husserl, he sees the variation method as
a major way to find the invariant features of relations which have essential ambiguities (Ihde & Selinger, 2003, P. 125). I
suppose there are interesting similarities between this view and the approaches of some relational philosophies of technology
and nature. For example, in Philosophy of Nature, Lie (2016) suggests a relational philosophy which rejects a kind of
passivism in essence-dispositions relations. Lie, who is interested in the relations of nature and artifacts, seeks a new
framework for thinking about these relations. In this context, unlike the passivism of Lock and Hume, Lie sees disposition
as a kind of activity or capacity to do something. He supposes that properties do not do anything in passivism. This is what
he calls ‘categorical properties’. Unlike categorical properties, dispositional properties do something (p.88). In this new
picture, only one set of properties are not connected to an entity and multiple sets of properties can be connected to an entity
(p.92). Therefore, the connections of dispositional properties and an entity are pluralistic in Lie’s relational-dispositional
philosophy. This is similar to what Ihde writes about the multistable nature of human-technology relations at the perception
level. Moreover, like dispositional properties, ‘dispositional entity” is highlighted in this context. This is similar to the
invariant feature of phenomenon in Ihde’s postphenomenology as well. I conclude that both of them introduce a relational
philosophy which is revolutionary, practice–oriented, and pluralistic. Related to the topic of this paper, both finally introduce
a relational essence. I suppose these similarities can be the subject of a comparative study. This kinds of study may make
specific connections between philosophy of technology and environmental philosophy that have not had creative dialogues.
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make sense of technology-culture relations. Some ambiguities about this cultural diversity are answered
when Ihde speaks about program three.
2.3. Program Three: Technology and Lifeworld

Ihde (1990) sees this program as the combination of programs one and two. On one side, lifeworld is
the basic level of primordial experience (program one), and on the other, it is the totality of implicit
beliefs by which we interpret our world (program two). In program three, he explores the interaction
of these two programs with regard to image-technologies. For Ihde, this program is totally
contemporary, because it is related to image–technologies which have only been highlighted very
recently. He sometimes defines our new situation as ‘postmodern’ to distinguish it from other times (p.
162). Ihde wrote about image–technologies before the last decade of the 20th century. Therefore, his
examples of these types of technologies are television, cinema, computer VDTs and so on. His aim is
to find the key features of the “current” time which are situated by image-technologies. This is what he
calls the “topography of lifeworld curvatures” (p. 162). Ihde highlights phenomena such as
“pluriculturality”, “decisional burden”, “materializing the conceptual”, and “oscillatory phenomena”
to show the features of modern technologies. In this context, “pluriculturality” is the essential feature
of the modern lifeworld that illustrates the important impacts of image–technologies on our cultures. It
is “a now-acquired vector of the contemporary lifeworld” (p. 177). For Ihde, this pluriculturality is a
specific type of cultural diversity that is dominant in modernity because of its picture–oriented artifacts
and technologies.
The uniqueness of this pluriculturality is grounded in the view that technological relations with
cultures necessarily shape our new situation. Ihde (1990) even regards this pluriculturality as a
postmodern condition to remark that we are living now in a different era than the modern time because
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of image-technologies. For example, a modern viewer may tend to think that the technologies are
neutral, namely, they represent clearly and carefully the subjects of images. But, this is not the case. A
postmodern viewer realizes this important point. S (he) knows that image-technologies change subjects
while representing them. How do the technologies work? Ihde comes back to the relations of noesis
and noema. The technologies change subjects by the way they represent the subject. This is what Ihde
calls the transfiguration of images by image-technologies. Based on his postphenomenological
approach, Ihde sees image–technologies as excellent examples of technological non-neutrality as well.
These technologies change the structure of an object which is taken. Image–technologies do not work
as mere neural instruments which exchange an image without serious modifications. One aspect of the
postmodern era, for him, is this awareness of living in a transient period which requires new
perspectives for analyzing the picture-technologies phenomena. According to Ihde, the new
perspectives agree with this non-neutrality of new types of technologies (pp. 161,165).17
Ihde remarks that his approach rejects both the utopian and dystopian temptations about technologies
and artifacts. He has written about his approach to these two perspectives in many writings.18 However,
Ihde (1990) admits that pluriculturality needs a specific analysis because it goes beyond the usual
descriptions of technologies. Ihde thinks that image–technologies can lead us to utopian views but
emphasizes that technologies have essential ambiguities too and are defined by the culture and context
in which they are used. It means that even though a naïve view may accept the utopian view on imagetechnologies, both utopian and dystopian views are rejected (pp. 163-64).
In summary, regarding my question about Ihde’s position on technological determinism, I tried to
write a description of Ihde's postphenomenology in three parts. The first part showed that four human-
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. For further discussion, see (Ihde, 2002, pp. 3-15).
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For example, see Ihde (1979) and Ihde (2010).
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technology relations, at the sensory level, have a crucial role in Ihde’s philosophy of technology and
aim to reject technological determinism and social determinism. At a cultural level, Ihde mentions that
technological determinism ignores technological relations with different cultures and forgets the active
function of culture in these relations. Finally, at the third level, he elaborates that pluriculturality, as an
instance of cultural diversity, is interwoven with image-technologies. He defends his thesis that this
plurality is the reason for an indeterministic character of image-technologies. In other words, imagetechnologies in their relations are non-neutral, but they do not determine culture. He thinks that the
pluriculturality can clearly show the indeterministic feature of image-technologies.
Even though his postphenomenology is not restricted to technological determinism, I read Ihde’s
project as an answer to it. I will discuss Ihde’s dialogue with this technological determinism in the next
section.
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3. Postphenomenology against Technological Determinism
As discussed, the relation between humans and technologies is one of the most central questions in the
philosophy of technology. I start with this broad definition of technological determinism that
technology shapes the society and culture of humans. As Dusek (2006) writes, technological
determinism believes that “technology causes or determines the structure of the rest of society and
culture” (p. 84). According to an account of this term, a single, massive trajectory happens by
technology. This position is the dominant view among the first generation of philosophers of
technology. Ihde (1990) sees Marcuse, Jonas, and Ellul as the representatives of this view (p. 123).19
One main ambiguity has to do with the meaning and cases of this prominent doctrine in the philosophy
of technology. Because of this, I suppose that specific distinctions may help us to have a better reading
of the meaning of technological determinism. These distinctions are: a) the distinction between
technological determinism and autonomous technology, b) the distinction between technological
determinism and social constructivism, and finally c) the distinction between hard technological
determinism and soft technological determinism.
The first distinction is between technological determinism and autonomous technology.
Technological determinism is concerned with the relations between culture and technology. In contrast,
autonomous technology is concerned with non-cultural forces that affect the development of
technologies--the development of technology by its own logic. Technologies are either neutral or
determine humans. If they are neutral, they cannot be autonomous because they are shaped by
something else. If they determine humans, they are either governed by themselves (autonomous) or by
other elements and forces. Even though this distinction is a helpful tip in the context of the philosophy
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. ‘Is there, then, a single, massive trajectory to the rise of high-technological culture and its attainment as a world
culture? If so, the Marcuses, Jonases, and Elluls would turn out to be the prophet for our times.’
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of technology, I suppose it is not highlighted in the relevant literature. So, many confusions between
technological determinism and autonomous technology can be seen there.20 This distinction is not clear
in Ihde’s writings either. My reading is that Ihde regards autonomous technology's view as an extreme
case of hard technological determinism.21
The other distinction is the division between social constructivism and technological determinism.
Social constructivism includes many different approaches and viewpoints, so I only focus on Bijker
and his collaborators’ book: The Social Construction of Technological Systems (2012). In this book,
they remark that the developmental process of technologies is based on a multidimensional model
which is the main feature of social constructivism of technology. Their famous example is the
development of different types of bicycles by different social mechanisms (pp. 22-28). Unlike
technological determinism which supposes the determination of culture and society by technologies,
social constructivism of technology refers to the determination of technologies by various societies. In
other words, technologies, in social constructivism of technology, are presumed to be neutral objects
which are shaped by social mechanisms and preferences. This is what Ihde totally abandons. However,
I suppose that because of the different accounts of social constructivism of technology, he usually uses
the term social determinism of technology.
The third key distinction is the distinction between hard technological determinism and soft
technological determinism. As I have mentioned, according to the common-sense account of
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. For example, we see in Encyclopedia of Science, Technology and Ethics (Mitcham, 2005, p. 511), that hard
technological determinism is considered to be a kind of autonomous technological doctrine. Ihde’s position, in
Technology and the Lifeworld, is similar to this view. He writes, “At an even greater extreme of the neutrality/nonneutrality debate, there are those who hold not only that technologies are not neutral but that once created and put in
place, technology (often with a capital: Technology) takes on a life of its own and becomes autonomous” (Ihde, 1990,
p.6). Dusek remarks on a similar point too. He regards autonomous technology’s doctrine as an approach which
presupposes technological determinism. This means that it is a radical version of technological determinism (Dusek, 2006,
p. 84).
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. I will discuss it in 6.2.2.
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technological determinism, technologies shape culture. However, the question is how technologies
change them. What is the quality and power of the effects? Hard technological determinism believes
that technologies necessitate the directions of cultures. This means whether we are utopian or dystopian,
technologies totally change us. Our future conditions are connected to our current conditions based on
some rules which are related to technological changes.22 The use of technology determines an “inquiry
that only certain directions are possible rather than others” (Ihde, 1979, p. 42). On the other hand, many
approaches in the philosophy of technology discuss the different kinds of soft technological
determinism which see technology as an important force to shape and form culture and society beside
other social, economic, and/or cultural causes. In addition, some schools see technological determinism
as a rule for showing that technological developments are not arbitrary (Smith and Marx, 1994, pp.
101-2). Namely, technologies follow some specific rules. As it might be focused, these accounts of
technological determinism (soft version) sometimes seem vaguely universal ones that cover many
different schools. Because of this ambiguity, I believe we must focus on various topics to develop
Ihde’s own interpretations of this term. This is what I’ll do here.
3.1. Ihde’s Challenges with Technological Determinism and Social Determinism

Ihde thinks that his postphenomenology can be seen as an answer to the question of human-technology
relations. This answer is against technological determinism’s and social determinism’s responses to
this question.23 By regarding technological determinism from a phenomenological viewpoint, an
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. Some scholars do not agree with this account of technological determinism. For example, see (Ellul, 1964, p. xxxiii)
and (Introna, 2005).
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. We can see the outline of his project here. He intends to answer the questions of social determinism and technological
determinism: “By developing a range of the types of experience of technological artifacts, I also hope to show how pervasive
our experiences of technologies are and thus show its necessary impact upon the way we must conceive of the world and
ultimately of ourselves...by displaying the variety and expanse of human – machine relations as they move toward a
presumptive ‘totality” the weaker thesis shows a strong form. Human – machine relations are existential relations in which
our fate and destiny are implicated, but which are subject to the very ambiguity found in all existential relations. At the
same time, this existential ambiguity has its roots in the notion of the lifeworld in which …prevents any total closure into
what might be called technocracy as an absolute mode of existence” (Ihde, 1979, p.4).
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account of technological determinism reflects two independent domains. “Technology” and “humans”
are related in such a way that “technology” shapes the culture of “humans”. In the broadest sense, it
presupposes a technological domain and a human domain in such a way that the technological domain
determines the human domain. Even though the position of social determinism is totally different from
technological determinism, the same issue occurs. This means that the supposition of social
determinism is the two distinct domains: technology and society. Therefore, on the first level, Ihde
(1979) sees these approaches as vague ideas because of a wrong presupposition. In other words, specific
readings of technological determinism and social determinism are meaningless before we can ask about
their justifications. Why? Because they suppose a strong distinction between humans and technologies.
Coming back to Heidegger’s terms, technologies are ready to our hands (Zuhandenheit) and not present
at our hands (Vorhandenheit) (Ihde, 1979, p.40). Technologies are not things in themselves; they are
“in order to” do something. They are for purposes in holistic contexts that follow human–technology–
world relations. In this context, the presupposition of the independence of technology and society is
totally wrong.
On the second level, we can think about technological intentionality in a human–artifact relation.
While working, technologies are “ready to our hands” and get their meanings through their relations
with us. However, the question is how we can speak about a deterministic feature in human–technology
relations. Ihde’s answer to these questions is no. I think, for Ihde, the nature of all types of intentionality,
including instrumental intentionality, is against technological determinism.
When Ihde (1990) talks about technological determinism, he is referring to the hard account of it.
He usually sees a necessary element in this doctrine in such a way that we cannot escape the determined
and fixed results of different technologies. We have various possibilities, but the development of a
technology is “a whole nest of possibilities that determine future directions for the socius” (Ihde, 1990,
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pp. 5-6). Ihde thinks that some philosophers and scholars such as Ellul, Marcuse, Mumford, and White
believe in various versions of hard technological determinism (pp. 5-6). Specifically, in many texts and
contexts, he highlights Lynn White’s and James Burke’s analyses of Middle Ages technologies to show
how technologies have changed throughout history. White, in his famous book Medieval Technology
and Social Change (1962), illustrates the way technologies shaped the social, political, and economic
systems of their times. The changes started with the invention of the stirrup.24 With this invention, a
new method of horseback riding became dominant in the Middle Ages. Warriors did not have to dive
down in a stabbing motion to use their lances at foot soldiers. They could fight with greater speed and
use the power of horses to spear the enemy. In this context, the change of lances allowed the warriors
to use them more than one time. Because of the change, they could withdraw after attacking the enemy.
After that, the stirrups, larger saddles, armor, and longbows were invented for adapting to this new
situation. New elite cavalries (knights) were one result of this new lifeworld (pp. 1-2). Ihde’s reading
of White’s book is that White sees technologies as the foreground elements of these changes.
Technologies are not only central because of their actions and effects but because, for developing, they
do not need to have specific social - political condition. This is an account of hard determinism that
regards technologies as autonomous forces (Ihde, 1990, pp. 4-6).
Ihde (1990) rejects this reading of technology, but it does not mean that he accepts the social
determinism of technology as an alternative. For him, social determinism of technology is a doctrine
that regards technological development as a result of power elites’ decisions and social and political
conflicts. He is interested in McCormick’s example of the reaper to clarify the central thesis of social
determinism. The reaper was introduced to replace hand scythes. It was a 19th century’s complex artifact
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made by skilled craftsmen. Factory management recognized the growing wage cost of skilled artisans.
So, its response was to break down the complex technology to simple processes in such a way that
unskilled workers could do them. It was a decision against the development of nascent union. This deskilled process was more expensive and not efficient at all, but the management aimed to eliminate the
union. As we see in this context, technology is in the background; it is a neutral element, and the conflict
of management and workers plays a major role in its development (p. 4). Ihde does not totally reject
social determinism and technological determinism.25 However, he thinks that they are incomplete views
on technology. By highlighting “the latent telos of technology” (inclination of technology), he intends
to illustrate his own position on this important question in the philosophy of technology.
3.2. The Latent Telos of Technology

Many approaches against technological determinism have been established in the literature of the
history and philosophy of technology. For example, one approach plans to defend a moderate (soft)
account of technology to challenge hard technological determinism. We can see this viewpoint in
Heilbroner’s “Technological Determinism Revised” in which he tries to defend a sensible meaning of
technological determinism. According to this assumption, technology does not determine cultures.
Heilbroner believes the question of technological determinism must be changed, meaning that we can
keep the term but change its question. “Does a machine make history?” is not a justifiable question in
modern times, so we must ask “how do machines make history?” (Smith & Marx, 1994, p. 69). He
sees an important premise in the idea of determinism, namely, this idea that living behavior is not
random and can be analyzed under “imprecise” regulations. Heilbroner thinks that these regulations are
“imprecise,” because human behaviors are affected by society and have an indeterminacy. By
introducing different degrees of determinism, he mentions that we can put technology in the
25
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background of our framework in which the foreground is the evolving social order. In this context, the
idea of technological determinism does not ignore the different possibilities and volitional elements of
social order. So, a kind of soft technological determinism can be justified without rejecting various
technological and non-technological possibilities in society. This account of technological determinism
accepts that, at least in modern societies, behaviour can be regulated, even though these regulations are
imprecise (p. 74).
On the other side, Thomas P. Hughes in “Technological Momentum” intends to go beyond social and
technological determinism by speaking about technological momentum as a flexible mode between
these two extremes. His presupposition is that technological systems are more complex than can be
explained by social and technological determinism (Smith & Marx, 1994, p. 69). In this context, he
speaks about momentum. Momentum is a quasi–deterministic power that drives itself and controls
institutions to follow its requirements. For him, the relation of society and technology is not
symmetrical over time; time plays a key role here. So, the relation of society and technology is time
dependent (pp. 104-105). When society sees an emerging technology, it can control that technology.
But when technological systems become more complex by gathering momentum, the systems are less
shaped “by” their society: They are more a “shaper of” their society (p. 106).26
Ihde picks up the second approach (Hughes’s way) by presenting “latent telos” (inclinations) of
technology. 27 Unlike social determinism, Ihde (1979) does not believe that technologies are neutral
and shaped by social conflicts and the preferences of the elite; they change our perceptions and cultures

. Winner (1977) prefers Hughes’s position. By referring to Heibroner’s view on technological determinism, he concludes:
“Perhaps the appropriate label for this state of affairs is not determinism at all but, instead, technological drift (p. 88). He
suggests other concepts such as momentum, energy, speed, force and energy for taking into account a process of
technological change (p.48).
27
. In Technics and Praxis (1979) he usually uses “latent telos”, but in Technology and the Lifeworld (1990) he refers to
the term of “inclination”.
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at micro and macro levels. As I showed in Section2, human-technology relations with the world are
completely different from human relations with the world without technology. Technologies change
the experienced world by the way we experience the world and vice versa. Therefore, technological
intentionalities are entirely different from other kinds of intentionalities. Unlike technological
determinism, this does not mean that technologies determine us. If they change our perceptions at
experience and culture levels, this means that they have a telic aim (inclination) which changes our
relations but which unseals new opportunities and options as well (pp. 40-45).
Latent telic inclinations limit our options and directions but do not determine them. One example of
this latent telic inclination shows itself when we use a typewriter. Like a pen, a typewriter involves an
embodiment relation, namely, it extends our bodily perception. A typewriter may increase the speed of
writing, so we can rapidly transfer ideas on paper. It is possible that the relative speed of writing even
changes our style of writing. Ihde supposes that writing with a pen gives more time to a writer to think
more. But this does not mean that typing determines (necessitates) a specific style of writing: some
latent telos is imposed, but otherwise, many new opportunities are introduced. Using typewriting only
highlights an instrumental intentionality with new options and possibilities. Therefore, latent telos
focuses on both non–neutral and indeterministic structures of instrumental intentionality (Ihde, pp. 426).
One feature of technological intentionality is its magnification/reduction structure (Ihde, 1990, pp.789). For example, in embodiment relations we see the moon with a telescope, it is an easy way to see
different areas of the moon. Meanwhile, it is fully different from walking on the moon. Seeing the
moon with a telescope is an easy way of seeing it, but something is missing: touching the moon. The
other example is an online conversation. When we chat with our friends online, we may realize that it
is fully different from face-to-face relations. The online relation is more applicable, but in one aspect,
28

it is far away from an authentic dialogue.28 However, we should not expect that watching the moon
with a telescope or an online technology determines and necessitates our inquiry in a certain direction.
They contain latent telos, namely, they are not neutral, but open new possibilities for us as well. As I
have written, Ihde’s effort is to show the point that the application of technology does not impose a
singular direction. By using technology, various options and directions are open to us even though this
technology imposes some inclinations. Ihde’s concept of technological determinism here is the
reduction of all directions and options to one singular way and trend. According to this doctrine,
technology necessitates one singular way. Specifically, it will be discussed in the next part.
3.3. Multiculturalism and Pluriculturality
As I wrote in Section 2, I think cultural diversity and pluriculturality can illustrate Ihde’s strategy to
defeat technological determinism at experimental and cultural levels. In part 2.2. and 2.3, I illustrated
basic features of these two terms. Here, I focus on the indeterministic elements of them.
Positively, Ihde supposes that technologies contain an ambiguous nature. Like a text, they have
diverse meanings in different contexts. At the micro level, they follow the multistable character and
create four specific relations based on the multistability of human–technology relations. Cultural
diversity is the appearance of this multistability at the macro level. Therefore, we can see a rule
regarding the relations of technology and humans, namely, the multistability of these relations at micro
and macro levels. In other words, the technological intentionalities have a plural character. Negatively,
these human–technology relations cannot be reduced in a unique direction rather than in other
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directions. In other words, based on the postphenomenological approach, the intentionality of these
relations have a plural structure (Ihde, 1991b, p. 65).29
At the macro level, for example, Ihde (1986) intends to highlight the dual interactions between
lifeworld and technology. Imagine a technology is imported to a culture. On the one side, lifeworld
makes meaning for the technology which has lost its last context. On the other side, technology creates
instrumental intentionalities and changes some aspects of the lifeworld. Therefore, not only does a
lifeworld with technologies differ from the lifeworld without technologies, but we also see different
lifeworlds which are based on different technological intentionalities (p. 124). This unique situation is
viewed clearly when image-technologies are situated in lifeworlds. According to Ihde, pluriculturality
is created and acts as a specific type of cultural diversity. In this context, a technological lifeworld has
a kind of totalization because of the latent relics of technology, but it does not include a deterministic
nature. This totalization creates new room for new directions, options, and possibilities.
One aspect of culture–technology relations are the ways technologies transfer from one culture to
another. Specifically, the ways technologies transfer from the mainly Northern Hemisphere hightechnology nations and the ways the developing nations accept them. For Ihde, this process is
ambiguous because of the function of a culture which makes a meaning for technology, and the function
of a technology which changes the structure of that culture. The key point is that technology is
transferred, but the lifeworld of it cannot be transferred. In this context, technological transfer is the
interaction of two lifeworlds that have two different instrumental intentionalities. Technology in a
culture has a kind of telos, and this telos leads to different possibilities. When this technology transfers
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to the other culture, the lifeworld of the second culture changes these limitations and possibilities (Ihde,
1990, pp. 131-32). 30
Ihde’s concern is not whether this transfer is good or bad. His opinion is that the transfer of technology
from one lifeworld to another one is more complex than what specific intellectual schools, such as
neocolonialism, suppose. If technological determinism and social determinism of technology were
right, the transfer of technology could be done very easily. Based on a hard version of technological
determinism, technology straightforwardly shapes a culture in which technology will be imported.
According to social determinism, technology is neutral and is easily shaped by the social relations of a
culture. However, what we see is that the transfer of technology is a big issue for developing countries.
This means that a new relation is happening during this transformation. Unlike that inaccurate picture,
this transfer is an obstacle, a problem which calls for new relations with a new culture. This
phenomenon can show that something is wrong in technological determinism and social determinism
(Ihde, 1990, pp. 125-127).
For Ihde (1990), the conditions of education in developing countries lead to a gap between developing
and developed countries on infrastructures of science and technology. In this context, it can be seen
that without the transfer of some fundamental basis of modern science and technology, the transfer of
technology is a big problem. It is the “massive failure” to transfer the infrastructure of culture (p., 136).
For Ihde, this phenomenon might be a sign of the theoretical problem of hard technological
determinism. If this was right, the infrastructure of culture could be transferred very easily.
Different reactions may be highlighted when we focus on the ways developing countries accept new
sciences and technologies. For example, Ihde (1990) refers to India, as a successful example of a

30

. In addition, see (Ihde, 1991b, p. 6).

31

colonized country, which is known for creating its own science-technology infrastructure. Ihde
presumes that Indian graduate students play a key role at US universities and regards this as an example
of the failure of technological transfer to developing countries. The transfer has been reversed in this
case. In addition, the conditions of Islamic countries show this gap more clearly. They totally realize
the conflicts between their culture and Western culture. The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism can
be understood in this context. He borrows the point from Heidegger that the way of seeing (the way of
having nature revealed) in culture is totally unique, and this is what constitutes the worldview of
technological culture (pp. 131-133). In summary, Ihde supposes that cultural diversity and its
consequence (pluriculturality) are fair reasons against hard technological determinism. His writings are
full of case studies to reject this. I’ll try to highlight more case studies in the following part.
3.4. Case Studies and Technological Determinism

Thomas J. Misa believes that our position on the relations between technological changes and culture
is totally shaped by the intellectual level we choose. If a macro level is chosen, the result is
technological determinism, and if a micro level is chosen, we can witness dual relations between
technology and culture (Smith & Marx, 1994, p. 15). This fact is usually approved by referring back to
the literature of the philosophy of technology. The first generation of philosophers of technology who
frequently had essentialist views (general ones) on technology usually lead to technological
determinism. On the other hand, the second generation usually emphasizes technology–human case
studies. As Scranton mentions, technological determinism is a production of holistic readings of
human–technology relations. These interpretations will be ineffective when we explore the artifacts in
their contexts and cultures (p. 43).
Ihde, as an influential figure of the second generation of this philosophy, talks over various
technological case studies as well (Achterhuist, 2001, p. 20). For example, when he develops four
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human–technology relations, we can recognize many stories about concrete technological cases: From
human– computer relations to the functions of clocks in ancient and modern cultures, from telescopes
and glasses to thermostats and musical instruments, from robots and image technologies to automations
and ritual items, from food industries in different cultures to agricultural machines and so on.31 In all
these case studies, one of Ihde’s aims is to show that the technological intentionality has a kind of telos
but this telos does not determine the structure of the intentionality.32
Because I highlighted Ihde's case studies in the other parts of this paper, I only write about two of his
many case studies here--clothing and photography. Technological texturing is an example of
background relations. For example, clothing insulates our bodies from external phenomena. Clothing
should not be put in an embodiment relation. The transparency of the embodiment relations may not
be seen here, because clothing plays the role of opacity without restricting movement. When clothing
is in the background, it means that clothing is not usually in the focal attention but “conditioning the
context in which the inhabitant lives” (Ihde, 1990, pp. 110-11). As I mentioned in Section 2, like other
types of human–technology relations, when the background relation fails, the background will become
foreground. Despite the various kinds of background relations, its intentionality imposes a telos on this
relation. This is the meaning of non-neutral for the background relation: clothing here inclines, not
determines, human experience. Its amplification/reduction structure changes indirectly the gestalt of
human experience by conditioning the context of our lives. In other words, the function of clothing is
a kind of atmospheric feature: it is a technosphere in which we do a good deal of our living (Ihde, 1979,
p. 14).
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The other examples are photography and TV which are related to the image-technologies category.
Ihde’s emphasis is the photos of National Geographic magazine. This magazine changed the space of
living rooms by showing a full variety of world cultures that were new to families. According to Ihde
(1990), viewing these photos was an inter-relation, namely they showed the features of other cultures
and were perceived based on the cultures of the viewers. It might be assumed that the photos are neutral.
This means that they transfer the objects as they are. However, this is not the case. The representation
of photos depends on the features of cameras: the way these photos represent objects. So, there is a gap
between an object and the photo of it. This is the meaning of the non-neutral character of a photo.
Because huge quantities of photos are put into motion on TV, it expresses clearly the non-neutral
character of image-technologies. For example, imagine a viewer watching a TV; the viewer is watching
specific photos in motion, but what s (he) understands can be something else. Viewed objects differ
from objects because of the feature of cameras. Therefore, here cameras are not neutral either. However,
this does not mean that photos impose a specific direction for us (Ihde, 1990, p. 166). Specific
inclinations are applied and other possibilities are introduced. Technologies are ambiguous and receive
their meaning based on their context. I will elaborate upon this ambiguity in the following sections.
3.5. Postmodern Condition against Technological Determinism

Andrew Feenberg (2000) thinks that after World War II the humanities and social sciences developed
a deep relation between modernism, essentialism, and technological determinism. Firstly, they
highlighted an essence for modernity. Secondly, they intended to see technology as the essence of
modernity. Specifically, Feenberg remarks that Ellul, Heidegger, and the Frankfurt school regard
modernity as a unique form of technical actions and thoughts (pp. 294-295). The relation of technology
and modernism is one of Ihde’s main concerns as well. I think his concern can be justified by the
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relations of this topic with technological determinism. Because of these relations, he sometimes regards
his project as a project developed in a postmodern era.
According to Ihde (1990), the postmodern era is one of transition which rejects all deterministic
projects about technologies and artifacts (p. 162). ‘Postmodern’ is a term that announces the end of the
modern, and the beginning of an enigmatic era. However, he highlights two characteristics of the
postmodern era. First of all, it is related to image-technologies. So, what he writes about pluriculturality
can be considered as a characteristic of the postmodern era.33 Secondly, it calls for the priority of praxis
and perception over theory and a priori intuition. What Ihde sees as the postphenomenological way can
be regarded as the features of the postmodern era. Therefore, the postmodern era is against Descartes’
subjectivism and fundamental epistemology. In addition, it sees an ambiguity in all terms and concepts
including technology and focuses on the relational way of thinking about them. In this context, his
project can be assumed as a postphenomenological position against the technocracy as an absolute
mode of being that is based on the modern era (Ihde, 1979, p. 4).34
He thinks that the ambiguity of technology in the postmodern context rejects any essentialist approach
toward the relations of technology and modernism. Postmodern is the other name for the idea of the
multiplicity of perceptions at micro and macro levels. Ihde (1990) writes, “the genius of the
postmodern, however, is not to eliminate any of the previous forms…Each variant becomes a, not the,
choice of expression” (p. 187). This means that he is easy with the modern era. He rejects an account
of modernism that does not accept the multistabile structure of the word at different levels.
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Ihde’s emphasis on “postmodern” can be regarded as the other interpretation of postphenomenology.
As I showed, there is a deep connection between the terms postmodern and postphenomenology.
However, it is another sign of an indeterministic feature of human-technology relations in Ihde’s
project. With regard to Feenberg’s insight, Ihde’s strategy is to represent an unessentialistic project
which rejects all deterministic accounts of technology. This is a better title for his overall project. In
this context, the indeterministic elements are not the intellectual consequences of his project, the
elements are the subjects of his postphenomenological project. This is what I mentioned in Section 1
and is the main theme of my paper.
3.6. “Controlling” Technology
The idea of ambiguity of technology, at perceptual and cultural levels, rejects the concept of
‘controlling technology’ that is a key topic in the philosophy of technology. The question is whether
technology can be controlled or not. Ihde presumes that this is an outdated question inside the
metaphysics of determinism. Ihde (1990), who thinks of technology as an ambiguous term which has
different meanings in different contexts, sees no difference between the control of technology and the
control of culture. In this context, if cultures can be controlled, technologies can be controlled as well.
The ambiguity of ‘technology’ and the dual relations of cultures and technologies are his reasons to
defeat technological determinism and emphasize the diverse sources of controlling technology (pp.
139-140). The combination of these views provides a response to the question of control of technology.
On the one side, technology does not determine a specific perception and lifestyle. On the other side,
there is a dual relation between technology and culture. These two suppositions are in contrast to
autonomous technology.
The concept of autonomous technology reminds us of Langdon Winner’s project in Autonomous
Technology (1977). By borrowing some deterministic elements of Ellul’s philosophy of technology,
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Winner explores the relations of the rise of modern technology and the new types of political life-namely technological politics. The main point of this book as well as his other work, The Whale and
the Reactor (1986), is that technology shapes the modern political order regardless of the context it is
located in (Mitcham, 1994, p. 187). As I mentioned, this is not Ihde’s worry. For Ihde (1990), the topic
of controlling technology: a) can be changed to the interaction of culture and technology, and b) is
related to specific middle-level topics like the type and degree of technological risk assessment,
technological agencies assessment, and so on. Ihde concludes that these political topics must be seen
as middle-level ones that “directly do not get at the deeper and broader cultural values that situate the
entire field on the debates” (p. 142).
Ihde supposes that his postphenomenology is able to reject both autonomous technology’s view and
technological determinism. However, the question is that, if his postphenomenology rejects both, what
are its normative features? This is what I will discuss in the following section.
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4. Postphenomenology and Normative Aspects of Artifacts
Because phenomenology is a descriptive knowledge of human experiences from a first person
perspective, it usually asks about the relationship of phenomenology (postphenomenology) and
ethics.35 This question seems more vital if we know that normative questions take unique positions in
the philosophy of technology. Yet based on the descriptive nature of his approach, it is a common
critique that Ihde’s postphenomenology has not emphasized normative questions (Selinger, 2006, p.
89). Because of this background, even though it is not easy to have a comprehensive reading of
normative features of Ihde’s philosophy, I focus on five distinctions which may lead us to a fair
understanding of his normative position on artifacts.
The division between the “moral sensibility on technology” and the “ethics of technology” is an
efficient distinction in Ihde’s philosophy. Ihde (1991b) is normally concerned about the positive and
negative consequences of a culture of technics: from the technological wars to environmental pollution,
from health care technological achievements to entertainment technologies, and so on (pp. xii-xiii).
According to Ihde (1990), however, two main technologically moral concerns are environmental
destruction and antimulticulturalism’s movements. We live in a world where having a fresh and clean
environment is a dream. On the other side, technological multiculturalism may be threatened by the
ideological concepts of science and technology (pp. 137, 138, 208, 209). Although these moral concerns
are viewed in his writings, the way he theorizes them is a major question. In this context, we can ask
what his ethics of technology is. To understand this question it is necessary to consider the dichotomy
of “is/ought”.
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The distinction between “is” and “ought” is a polemical debate in ethics in general and in the ethics
of artifacts in particular. However, Ihde sees this distinction as a pseudo problem happening as a result
of Descartes’ subjectivism. Like the dualisms of humans/artifacts, humans/the world, subject/object,
and science/hermeneutics, this one is based on this subjectivism too. So, according to a
postphenomenological perspective these gaps are omitted because they are founded on the wrong basis
(Selinger, 2006, p. 279). In this context, the ethics of technology is totally context–oriented ethics: This
ethics depends on the context of a lifeworld. Because we have different lifeworlds, and ethics must be
conditioned by lifeworld, then we have different kinds of ethics of technology. If technology has an
ambiguous character and various meanings in different contexts, different norms and values are
recognizable (p. 277). Based on this approach, Ihde can only accept one normative virtue, namely the
virtue of plurality that is totally related to his postphenomenlogical way which accepts the multiplicity
and variety of technological experience. The gap between “is'' and “ought'' is blurred by this multiplicity
rule. It says, “what a phenomenon is in a specific context,” and then “what we should do in that
lifeworld.” For him, the ethics of technology goes beyond the distinction of “is” and “ought'', takes
seriously the diversity of moral codes and rules in different cultures, and finally judges based on
thinking about specific cases and situations (p. 278).
The distinction between moral relationism and moral relativism is helpful to understanding Ihde’s
approach as well. The question is “whether he leads to a kind of moral relativism or not, if the ethics
of technology depend on a lifeworld and are conditioned by it.” Because of his emphasis on lifeworld
(context) as the source of moral values, can he introduce some independent values or does he fall in a
context dependency view in ethics?36 He denies that he is a relativist and claims that his approach is a
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kind of relationism: “I am a relativistic thinker, not a relativist” (Albrechtslund, 2003). 37 What is the
difference between them? His answer is that he thinks about things in inter-relational terms. This means
that he is a phenomenologist or a postphenomenologist and thinks relationally about human-technology
relations. This is what I discuss in Section 2. Even though I doubt he could escape relativism in general
and moral relativism in particular by making a distinction between these two terms, his remarks again
show his intellectual priority to escape from detailed theoretical debates such as the different accounts
of moral relativism and moral relationism. Ihde might say these debates are related to the theoretical
paradigm or Descartes' subjectivism, so they're inaccurate. His normative relationism and his practical
turn will be evaluated, respectively in 6.2.4 and 6.2.5.
What Ihde says about the dependency of ethics on the lifeworld highlights the division between moral
universalism and moral particularism. Though there are many different accounts of these two terms,
we may say that, unlike moral universalism, moral particularism focuses on particular conditions and
situations to evaluate our behaviours. This means moral thought should not be grounded on the
application of moral principles to cases.38 Ihde (1990) defends an account of technological moral
particularism which emphasizes the context and situation of human–artifact relations to make decisions
about what we should do and how we solve our normative issues. In this context, the ethics of
technology must be founded on insightful research on specific cases. This is the right way to have a
fair ethics of technology. Finally, we must remember that all research endeavours are temporally and
context dependent. So, they may be context-oriented and can change over time. Therefore, they always
need revisited contemplations (pp. 180-184, 200).
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The last distinction, the most important one for our discussion, is the division between technological
utopism and dystopism. This dichotomy can be seen in his different writings. 39 In addition, this has a
huge history. Robert Shelton thinks utopism and dystopism psychologically are justified by two long
term human concerns about their futures: hope and fear (Mitcham, 2005, p. 2010). Specifically, at the
beginning of the modern era, a new approach toward utopian culture had been developed by Francis
Bacon in New Organon (2000) in which he was so optimistic about the application of science and
technology to reject different traditional superstitions and idols and create an ideal society (Klein,
2003). Thinking about Bacon’s project, Ihde (1990) accepts that modern time began with the idea that
science and technology may create an ideal culture for humans (a utopian view). However, two world
wars in the twentieth century refuted the idea and highlighted two alternative views (p. 6). 40 The first
was a doubt about the idea: a kind of agnostic position on this subject. The second was that we are
going toward a dystopian end: we are going to hell (Ihde, 1986, pp. 79-81).
Ihde (1990) thinks that the modern versions of both technological utopism and dystopism rely on a
deterministic approach toward modernism and technology as the main forces and causes of it. In this
context, the conditions of justification of these two views are two presuppositions. Firstly, we must
accept a linear concept of history: History starts from a beginning point and goes to the end point.
Secondly, the feature of this movement is based on technological laws which are the essence of
modernism (pp. 6-7). In other words, both utopian and dystopian views on technology regard
technology as a phenomenon which has an essence, and its essence is clear: good (utopian view) or evil
(dystopian view). Unlike Ihde’s approach, these views do not assume that technology has an ambiguous
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character and feature (Ihde, 1986, pp. 79-81).41 We can realize that Ihde’s reasons to reject utopian and
dystopian views parallel his reasons to reject technological determinism. First of all, Ihde (1991b)
thinks that technologies have ambiguous features and must be evaluated in their contexts. We can
evaluate whether they have positive or negative consequences after the establishment of technologies
in their contexts. Based on this presupposition, plurality is the main feature of human–artifact relations
at micro and macro levels. This diversity cannot be reduced to utopian or dystopian views. In summary,
technology does not have an essence from which we can judge whether it is good or bad. We only have
different human–technology relations in different contexts. In other words, we do not have
“Technology”. We have technologies in different contexts with plural consequences. Moreover, these
technologies have an increase/decrease character, they work based on a trade off rule: give something
and take something back (p. 119). All these presuppositions are against utopian and dystopian views of
technology.
Heidegger is Ihde’s main philosophical figure, so we can ask about their intellectual relations on these
topics. Heidegger disagrees with the presuppositions of dystopian or utopian views, but he accepts a
kind of romanticism towards technologies. Ihde (2010) believes that Heidegger could not realize four
human–artifact relations and reduced them to embodiment relations. Because of this reduction,
Heidegger sees nostalgic elements in our relations with technology. This led to his technological
romanticism (p. 79).
Because of the importance of Ihde’s dialogue with Heidegger, this dialogue will be explored in the
following section.
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5. Ihde and Heidegger
My aim here is to show the features of Ihde’s dialogue with Heidegger on technological determinism
and refer to the dystopian view on technology as a related topic to technological determinism in this
context. Heidegger is the main philosophical figure in Ihde’s phenomenology of technics. Yet, Ihde
(1991b) is not a mere commentator of Heidegger. He refers to Heidegger to articulate and answer his
own questions in the philosophy of technology. Ihde thinks, unlike the common sense perception, we
do not have a fair knowledge of the features and structures of technologies just now (p., xiii). Therefore,
he comes back to Being and Time (the first philosophy of Heidegger) and The Question Concerning
Technology (as an example of his second philosophy) to deliberate thoughtfully about the human–
technology relations.42

Based on his main question about the relations of humans and artifacts, Ihde has a specific intellectual
relationship with Heidegger’s philosophy. A usual commentary effort of this portion of Heidegger's
philosophies might be defending some accounts of “tools analysis” (Heidegger, 1927/2010) and “the
question concerning technology” (Heidegger, 1977), but “this theoretically oriented game of
interpretations” is not Ihde’s main concern. Even though he has some interesting interpretations of
Heidegger’s philosophies, these interpretations are pursued to develop his own project, namely, the
postphenomenology of technics. They are defined on a practice-oriented base. For example, in his
discussion about the historical–ontological priority of technology over science, he focuses on the
continuity between two philosophies of Heidegger and tries to read this continuity from the second
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philosophy to the first one. Like Heidegger, Ihde intends to see technology as a philosophical question
in its relation with humans in the lifeworld. Finally, he develops his own interpretations of Heidegger’s
text. Although the readings could be regarded as an interesting interpretation in the literature of
Heidegger, this is not what Ihde intends to do.43

Does Heidegger admire a hard account of technological determinism? It is a difficult question. My
emphasis is that Ihde’s reading of Heidegger’s philosophies suggests that Heidegger does not defend a
hard version of technological determinism. It is a plausible understanding that neither Heidegger nor
Ihde agrees with technology as a neutral tool. The question is, if technologies are not neutral, whether
they determine (necessitate) us or not. Ihde (1979) interprets the deterministic aspect of The Question
Concerning Technology in a specific way that goes beyond hard technological determinism. Heidegger
writes, “We shall call the standing that gathers, that first starts man upon a way of revealing, destining.”
Ihde reads this destining as a telos, a direction, and a framework that provides a “set of conditions as
an inclination.” It is not a fate that compels at all (p. 113). Ihde intends to say that his position is similar
to Heidegger’s view.

For Ihde (1979), this is the characteristic feature of phenomenology that offers a free relationship
with technologies in the world. In this context, Ihde believes that Heidegger introduces a range of
possible responses to technology (p. 114). Ihde focuses on the combination of “freedom” and “destiny”
in Heidegger’s philosophy. For Heidegger, “freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time
starts a revealing on its way” (p. 114). Ihde thinks this quote is important because it introduces free
relations to the essence of technology.
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Ihde’s reading of destining in the second philosophy of Heidegger can clearly show his usual
approach toward Heidegger’s philosophy. Unlike what a philosophical scholar follows, he is not
interested in mentioning different interpretations and defending what seems justified. He wants to use
Heidegger’s philosophy as a jumping off point for his own. In this context, destining can be regarded
as a kind of inclination.

Related to our discussion on technological determinism, we can ask whether or not there is any
exception for this intellectual strategy in which he breaks this specific connection to Heidegger. My
answer has two distinct subjects: firstly, when Ihde interprets Heidegger’s position on the ontological
primacy of technology (praxis) on science (theory) and, secondly where Ihde reads Heidegger’s
technological romanticism.

I start with the priority of technology (praxis) over science (theory). I showed, in Sections 1 and 3,
that Ihde has a specific sympathy with the ontological priority of Zuhandenheit over Vorhandenheit
that was introduced by Heidegger. For Ihde (2010), this is a historical–ontological priority and is not
restricted to an ontological one. Specifically, he explored this priority in modern science showing that
without the development of instrumentation, we could not see modern science. Ihde refers to the history
of modern technologies to illustrate the role of technologies for the rise of modern science. For example,
how optics developed because of the invention of lenses, as well as the relationship between the
invention of the clock and the rise of modern physics (pp. 56-65).

Though the historical-ontological primacy of technology over science is a kind of revision to
Heidegger’s philosophies, Ihde’s main criticism is that Heidegger cannot see the multistabilities of
technologies (Ihde, 2010, p. 114). Heidegger has a nostalgic taste for older artifacts as well (p., 120).
To display this contrast, Ihde emphasizes the differences of pens and typewrites in Heidegger’s view.
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Heidegger (1942/1992) sees a deep relation between human beings' hands and words; he says, “Only a
being, such as the human, that ‘has’ the word can and must ‘have hands’” (pp. 84-85). The word is
handwriting. Therefore, when we use a typewriter, we do not have access to the genuine way of writing
which is related to handwriting. By using typewriters, we fall in a mechanical process that is far from
the authentic trend of writing. It is a fall from a creative process into a mechanical one (Ihde, 2004b).
This is what Ihde calls a nostalgic account of technology.
Ihde’s analysis is totally different. Ihde (2010) even wrote an article about the major moments of the
history of writing. This is what he calls “phenomenological variations in writing practice” (p. 128). By
coming back to the writings of historians of writing, he emphasizes what has happened since the Ice
Age, at least since 20,000 BP, in the methods and styles of writings. The oldest materials of inscriptions
were cliffs, stones, and bone “tablets.” So, hard and sharp instruments were needed to make the
inscriptions. He spoke about a huge turn happening as early as by 4000-3000 BP: the creation of soft
writing technologies. The hard tablet was changed into a scroll and uniform light colored surface. The
bodily activity decreases for writing by this transformation. This trend leads to a sort of curvilinear
playfulness in writing. A pen, which itself has been changed over time, is the production of this
instrumental turn. Ihde again remarks that this trend does not determine what can be inscribed, rather
it introduces some inclinations. Finally, he refers to the typewriter and keyboard and shows the different
patterns of selectivity they introduce. Every pattern requires a specific exploration and one unique
analysis cannot reach these different patterns, one size does not fit all. This is what, Ihde thinks,
Heidegger does in his analysis of the difference between a pen and a typewriter (pp., 128-132).

I suppose this comparison can show the differences of two phenomenological investigations on
artifacts and technologies. One analysis (Heidegger’s) does not have any place for historical data and
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references, and leads to a romantic sense toward the old technologies (the pen), meanwhile the other
(Ihde’s) is open to case studies and sees an increase/decrease structure in all technologies. This point
approves what I claimed before in Section 1, namely, this claim that Ihde is in the intersection of
engineering and humanities philosophies of technology. This philosophy is a totally case studies
oriented phenomenology and can not defend a hard account of technological determinism. However, it
needs more analytical clarification. This is what is shown in the last section.
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6. An Evaluation
These five sections give me an opportunity to evaluate Ihde’s project on human–technology relations.
As mentioned, my question regards the features of Ihde’s dialogue with technological determinism. I
explained that Ihde introduces a reading of phenomenology (postphenomenology) to go beyond the
deterministic account of technology. Postphenomenology introduces latent telos and inclinations as two
terms to reject hard technological determinism. This project has come with normative consequences
which I referred to in Section 4. Moreover, in Section 5, I argued that Ihde reads Heidegger’s two
philosophies in a way that may support his view on human-technology relations. I intend to evaluate
his project in this section. My specific question here is whether postphenomenology is a successful
strategy to defeat determinism’s position on human-technology relations.

I aim to come back to the increase/decrease structure, which was introduced by Ihde as a
postphenomenological term, to see what he could get and what he might lose on his way: What does
he see, and what did he have to ignore based on his postphenomenology? I aim to see this trade off in
Ihde’s plan by analyzing this increase/decrease structure.

6.1. The Increase Aspect of Postphenomenology

I suppose that five points can show the increase aspect of his project. These are a) opening a new
approach toward technological determinism, b) questioning Heidegger’s project, c) defeating
technological utopism and dystopism, d) introducing multiculturalism, and finally, e) illustrating new
concepts. These are explored below.

As told, technological determinism is an answer to the question of human–technology relations. Ihde
challenges this position by questioning important presuppositions of the idea. On one side, there is
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technology, and on the other side, there are humans. What is the relation between them? Technology
shapes human culture. Ihde’s position is that the story is totally different, because technologies are in
relations with humans in contexts which define the functions for those technologies. When technologies
are in relations with humans, we have a specific instrumental intentionality. This intentionality is not
neutral and does not determine humans. Technologies have specific inclinations and latent telus. They
open directions and opportunities to us with specific limitations (inclinations). This new perspective on
human–technology relations, which is based on many case studies, is interesting and consistent with
his postphenomenology.

Technological determinism only focuses on Vorhandenheit and forgets Zuhandenheit. In
Vorhandenheit, the separation of humans and technology is possible. It happens while technology is
regarded as a thing and not as a tool. However, when a tool works, Zuhandenheit happens which
consists of four human–technology relations, cultural diversity (multicultural), and pluriculturity (as
the sample of this diversity in image-technologies’ era).
The second topic is Ihde’s questioning of Heidegger’s two philosophies. I showed that Ihde started
his project in the philosophy of technology by thinking about Heidegger’s two philosophies. However,
he intends to go beyond them. Ihde has criticized Heidegger for ignoring a diverse spectrum in which
different human–technology relations are developed. This ignorance leads Heidegger to a romanticist
approach toward technology that Ihde always criticizes. As I have mentioned, the most important
difference between Ihde and Heidegger is that Ihde’s philosophy is supported by detailed case studies
which cover a huge range of technological stories and allegories. Although neither Heidegger nor Ihde
defend a hard account of technological determinism, I agree with Ihde that Heidegger’s two
philosophies fall into a romanticism which cannot see the increase/decrease structure of technologies.
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In this sense, Heidegger’s approach is a reductionist one in which he uses one measure for evaluating
all technologies. In other words, Ihde admires Heidegger for thinking about the primacy of
Zuhandenheit over Vorhandenheit, but his critique is that Heidegger could not see the spectrum of
human–artifact relations. According to Ihde, Heidegger reduces this spectrum in the embodiment
relation. This reduction leads Heidegger to a technological romanticism which Ihde totally rejects. His
postphenomenological project, since 1979 while writing Technics and Praxis, could criticize
Heidegger’s philosophies for neglecting this spectrum.

Ihde had an interesting exchange with utopism and dystopism as well. I illustrated that there is a direct
relation between technological utopism (and dystopism) and technological determinism.44 At one level,
these two views have wrong presuppositions: They regard an essence for technologies as the main force
and cause of a linear history. Ihde does not accept these presuppositions. At the other level, Ihde sees
these views as big obstacles to evaluate the positive and negative sides of different technologies. For
him, a technological lifeworld is a domain with an increase/decrease structure which cannot be
evaluated with a single specific criterion. This perspective creates a space to think about different
aspects of technologies. He has thought carefully about the philosophical projects of some philosophers
of technology that have evaluated technologies only by one criterion and have not seen the multiplicity
of them. So, he has become very sensitive about the normative evaluation of technologies. He usually
refers to his key point that technology has an essential ambiguity. One aspect of this point is that
technology must be regarded as an enigma in human–technology relations. His criticism of the first
generation of philosophers of technology is that they presuppose they know what the essence of
technology is. For Ihde (1986), this is an inaccurate position. We do not have enough knowledge of the

44

. See Section 4.

50

structure and relations of technologies. In this context, he supposes that technology is not essentially
negative or positive; it is essentially ambiguous. Technology has an essential ambiguity which gets
meaning in its different relations with humans and the world (p. 131). Therefore, we should not regard
it as good or bad before seeing them in these relations. I sympathize with his basic view toward
technology.
In addition, Ihde’s postphenomenology is open to many concrete technological questions in our era.
It is sensitive to the plural embodiments of technologies in different cultures. He believes we can only
infer one universal normative value from his philosophy, and that is cultural diversity (or pluriculturity
as one aspect of it). The interesting point is that this cultural diversity is directed to many different
cultural and economic questions: from the ways cultures export and import technologies to the
phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism, from the relation of privacy and information technologies to
many case studies which focus on old and new civilizations.45 With regard to these elements, I think
his postphenomenology is one of the most comprehensive projects in the literature of philosophy of
technology.
Finally, Ihde is very proficient in creating new concepts regarding humanity’s new situations in
technologized culture and lifeworld. I highlighted many of them in this paper. For example, he
conceptualized four human–technology relations (embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, and background),
and came back to cultural diversity and pluriculturity to describe our relation to technologies at the
macro level. In addition, he introduced inclination and latent telos as two terms to challenge

45

. For example, in (Ihde, 1990, pp. 124-161), he develops his second program in which these examples have been
highlighted.
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technological determinism. His related readings of famous allegories and stories are dominant in his
writings. I regard this strategy as an advantage of his philosophy.

6.2. The Decrease Aspect of Postphenomenology
Ihde’s project, for me, is a comprehensive plan which presents phenomenological philosophy as its
method, covers many domains and fields by a unique openness toward different technological subjects
and consists of specific intended and unintended consequences. As mentioned, all aspects of this project
are not the subjects of my paper. I tried to give a report of his project based on one specific subject,
namely, the subject of technological determinism. In this part, I expect to write about the decrease
aspect of his answer to this topic by raising five topics.

6.2.1. Technological Determinism and Multistability

Ihde passionately aims to defend his theory that technological multistability at micro and macro levels
can reject hard technological determinism. His argument has four points:

a. There are four human-technology relations at the micro level.
b. Cultural diversity (multicultural) is viewed when we see human–technology relations at the
macro level.
c. Plurality of technological relations at the micro and macro levels is the necessary and sufficient
condition of an indeterministic account of technology.
d. Therefore, hard technological determinism is invalid.

In Sections 2 and 3, I showed that he accepts (a) and (b). In addition, Ihde (1979) defines hard
technological determinism as the determination of a certain direction by using given technological
artifacts regardless of other forces and context (p. 42). Ihde (1990) focuses on a single, massive
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trajectory happening with technological culture as a feature of hard technological determinism (p. 123).
I think these points can show that he accepts (c). However, I doubt that this argument is right; the
problem is in (c). I think technological multistability is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition
of an indeterministic account of technology. It will be argued in two steps.

I start with the first part of my claim, namely the part that technological multistability is the necessary
condition of an indeterministic account of technology. I thinks I can easily show that this multistability
is not the necessary condition of an indeterministic account of technology. How? By highlighting this
point that this indeterministic account of technology is compatible with technological monism as the
opposite of technological multistability. This monism means that technological relations can be reduced
to a specific technological relations. By referring to this definition, we can imagine a culture in which
the monism of technological relations is viewed even though the cultural structures are not determined
by technologies. In this context, we would imagine that the other forces and sources can guide the
culture. For example, the political order determines this unity. Or like the example of social
determinism, the conflicts of the elite may determine the culture. Based on this argument, we can
conclude that the plurality is not the necessary condition of his account of technology.
My argument is that if we accept that Ihde’s project represents properly the plurality of technological
relations, this cannot be the necessary condition for an indeterministic view on technology. From a
more fundamental approach, it is a crucial question whether this multistability is reducible to a monism
or not. Ihde rejects the position of some first generation philosophers of technology46 who see a certain
direction by using given technological artifacts. In contrast, Ihde thinks we can imagine different
directions for technologies. According to Ihde, these scholars think that the plurality can be reduced to

46

. Such as Marcuse, Jonas, and Ellul.
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a singular direction based on a universal technological rule. Ihde does not accept this view. In other
words, we have different layers of discussion. At one level, we can accept the plurality of human–
artifact relations. Here, there is not a disagreement between Ihde and Marcuse, Jonas, and Ellul. The
disagreement happens at the second level where this plurality may be reduced to a singular way. I
supposed that Ihde was right and asked about plurality at the second level as the necessary condition of
an indeterministic account of technology. It is surely an open question whether or not the plurality is
reducible to a monism.
The other aspect of Ihde’s claim is that this multistability is the sufficient condition for an
indeterministic account of technology. I suppose this claim is not right as well. Technological
multistability may be divided to the multiplicities of technological design, technological assumption,
technological distribution, and technological interpretation. In all these aspects, technological
multistability means the diversity of technological relations could not be reduced to a single way and
trajectory. Ihde explored this at two levels in his writings. He shows that human–technology relations
have a multistable feature at sensory and cultural levels. My point is that this diversity challenges the
monism of technological relations. I suppose this approach is successful for rejecting this kind of
monism. However, it is not challenging technological determinism. Based on this distinction, we can
imagine a culture that even though is governed by technological determinism, has a plurality which is
not reducible to a singular way. This means that the combination of technological determinism and
plurality is possible. I think many case studies can support this view. For example, imagine the
functions of smartphones in diverse cultures and societies. There are many different possibilities for
using such devices. In any culture, one dominant direction can be established by focusing on one
possibility. So, the output is the diversity of directions in different cultures. In this context, Ihde speaks
about a) the ambiguity of technology and b) the different meanings of it in various cultures. I suppose
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it is possible that the first view is right and the second one is wrong. This means that we can accept this
phenomenological supposition that technology is ambiguous, but the determination of a specific culture
by technology may be accepted. It shows that the plurality of technology is not the sufficient condition
for an indeterministic account of technology.

My point is that the determination of all cultures by technology denies any plurality, but the
determination of a culture by technology does not need this presupposition. I suppose Ihde’s failure to
make a distinction between these accounts of hard technological determinism is the reason for this
confusion. We must distinguish between nomological and culturally sensitive accounts of hard
technological determinism. The nomological account may claim that every event is necessitated by
antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of technological rationality and development.47
Based on this account, the laws of technological development impose a singular direction to history: to
all cultures. However, according to the culturally sensitive account, even though technology imposes a
singular direction to a specific culture, this direction is different from one culture to another. Hard
technological determinism mentions that a single, massive trajectory happens by technology. Is this
trajectory in all cultures the same or different? If it is the same, we have nomological determinism. If
the answer is “no”, the culturally sensitive account of it occurs.
My favorite case study is the application of Telegram in Iran. In this context, Telegram’s main
function in Iran, which has a semi–totalitarian religious government, is free media for different cultural,
political, economic, and private dialogues. Its function in Iran may be totally different from its function
in North America. We can suppose that Telegram in Iran has led to a cultural direction. So, this is a
kind of hard determinism. However, this does not mean that Telegram necessitates all cultures around
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. This term is used by Bruse Bimber in (Smith & Marx, 1994, pp. 80-82).
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the world. This is an important question: in what context we want to speak about hard technological
determinism? A specific culture or all cultures? As I mentioned, if we think about hard technological
determinism in a specific culture, it is compatible with a cultural diversity at the inter-cultural level. In
other words, the culturally sensitive account of hard technological determinism is consistent with the
diversity of cultures.

6.2.2. Technological Inclination, Autonomous Technology

I showed in Section 3 that, in one aspect, there are two positions on the concept of technological
determinism. One position, which prefers to keep this term, highlights some specific accounts of it. For
example, Heilbroner in “Technological Determinism Revised” intends to defend a soft account of
technological determinism in which technology is in the background and the foreground is the evolving
social order (Smith & Marx, 1994, pp. 67-78). The other position aims to introduce new terms in place
of technological determinism. For example, Thomas P. Hughes in “Technological Momentum”
introduces technological momentum instead of technological determinism as a quasi–deterministic
power which, as a time dependent force, keeps itself and controls institutions to follow its requirements
(pp. 103-104). Ihde chooses the second position by presenting “latent telos” (inclinations) of
technology. 48
I think it is optional to choose either the first or the second position. However, every option must
mention what its point is about technological determinism, especially the soft account of it.
Unfortunately, this is what Ihde does not do. He particularly had to write about it because he spoke
about hard technological determinism. Therefore, if he supposes that this account sees a certain
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. In Technics and Praxis (1979) he usually uses “latent telos”, but in Technology and the Lifeworld (1990) he refers to
“inclination”.
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direction by using given technological artifacts, the question is what the soft account of technological
determinism is. Is it similar to his own view which sees an inclination (latent telos) for technologies in
their relation with humans? Is there any difference between them? Ihde’s writings do not answer these
kinds of questions.
This confusion may lead to another dichotomy which is not totally clear in Ihde’s writings: The
dichotomy of technological determinism and autonomous technology. In his introduction, Ihde (1990)
speaks about technological determinism. He highlights Burke and White’s example on medieval
technology. Ihde concludes that technology occupies a foreground position, “Technologies simply
follow a line of development almost contextless, as it were” (pp. 5-6). This is not a version of
technological determinism, it is an account of autonomous technology’s view which regards technology
as an independent domain that follows a direction based on its own rules. I discussed the difference in
3.1. In summary, Ihde sees autonomous technology’s view as an extreme case of technological
determinism. I showed in this paper that this is an inaccurate picture of autonomous technology.
Ihde’s postphenomenology, while discussing technological determinism, suffers from an analytical
disadvantage. Particularly, it is not able to develop clear distinctions such as the distinction between
hard and soft technological determinism, the distinction between soft technological determinism and
his view on “the inclination” for technology, and finally technological determinism and autonomous
technology’s view.
6.2.3. Dual Relations of Technology and Culture

Ihde provides an innovative and interesting analysis of human-artifact relations at the micro level.
Though specific inconsistencies are viewed at this level, he represents a comprehensive analysis at the
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experimental level.49 But my main criticism is on his analysis at the cultural level where he develops
Program 2. Many ambiguities happen while expanding this level of discussion. For example,
“lifeworld” has not been explored very clearly in his writings. Even though this is a complex term in
the literature of phenomenology, he could write more clearly about it. Especially because the topic of
his most important book, Technology and The Lifeworld (1990), is technology-lifeworld relations. It is
not easy to find a comprehensive account of “lifeworld” in this book. This analytical deficiency is not
restricted to this term and some other essential concepts and topics have been left without enough
clarifications and elaborations at the macro level. One important topic is the relation of culture and
technology.

Ihde does not show the relations of cultures and technologies clearly. As I have mentioned in 2.2 and
2.3, he remarks that technologies have an essential ambiguity. They are embedded in different
cultures by creating new relations and technologies. This means that a dual interaction exists between
technology and culture. Culture gives a meaning to technology by constituting the technology-culture
relation. Moreover, technology in this relation changes its structure. Many questions are raised based
on this dual relation. Can we see overlapping areas in different culture-technology relations? May we
see active interactions between them? What are the differences between the ways culture changes
technology and the way technology changes culture? Human–technology relations are different, but
what is the quality of this difference? Are they related to different paradigms? And so on.

49

. In (Ihde, 1990), we can find some inconsistencies. For example, he says "the machine activity in the role of
background presence is not displaying either what I have termed a transparency or an opacity. The "withdrawal" of this
technological function is phenomenologically distinct as a kind of ‘absence’"(p. 109). But he mentions somewhere else
that clothing as an example of the background relations has a certain opacity (p. 110).
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Let’s recall Ihde’s clock example in a concrete context to illustrate my point. If I want to summarize
this example, I can say that the clock–human relation in Western civilization is usually related to the
amount of mechanical movement, while in ancient Chinese civilizations it is related to heavenly
movements. One artifact, in this case a clock, has a different meaning in each civilization. I have
specific questions here: What does he mean while speaking about Western and Chinese civilizations?
Can we say that every civilization consists of different cultures? May we have different human–
technology relations which have some overlapping areas? Do Chinese civilizations have only one
concept for a clock? What can we say about subcultures in these civilizations? What are the relations
of lifeworlds of these two civilizations? Can there be common areas between these lifeworlds? I cannot
find consistent answers for these questions in Ihde’s writings.

After these three critical analyses which are directly related to the subject of technological
determinism, I highlight two more criticisms which are not directly connected to technological
determinism that ask about the structure of postphenomenology of technology that is an indeterministic
account of technology and an answer to hard technological determinism.

6.2.4. Normative Consequences of Postphenomenology

Ihde thinks about a philosophical framework, namely, postphenomenology which aims to reject some
dominant approaches such as hard technological determinism by focusing on the ambiguity and
uncertainty of all domains like culture, technology, and their relations. Like all other intellectual
systems, this position has intended and unintended theoretical consequences. However, my point here
is that his moral position, as a consequence of his postphenomenology, is based on two factors. One is
his postphenomenology and the other is his fear of agreement with hard technological determinism, as
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well as utopian and dystopian views. In other words, this fear guides his position in the ethics of
technology as well.
As I illustrated in Section 4, Ihde’s position in the ethics of technology is a kind of ethical
particularism which does not have any a priori fundamental moral principles. We must pay attention
to different case studies and think about the temporally moral aspects of them. In this context, Ihde may
regard his moral position as moral relationism. But it is a kind of moral relativism which is silent in all
technological cases in advance. His postphenomenology has only one universal principle, namely the
sensory and cultural pluralities which lead to the recognition of the diversity of moral principles. His
main concerns are environmental pollution and cultural-technical violence but these do not mean that
we can realize them before the establishment of human-technology relations. When the relations work
and after that, we can think about the negative and positive effects of them. But here many questions
are raised as well. Is there any common value to the evaluation of different human-technology
relations? Who must regard a specific relationship as fundamentalism or political or technological
violence? Is there any commensurability to the evaluation of two technology-culture relations? And so
on. Ihde’s account of postphenomenology does not let him know the answers to these questions. This
is what some of his critics have written about.50

Does this mean that his postphenomenology essentially is silent about these questions? My answer is
“no.” Ihde’s phenomenology could have universal principles if one fear was absent in it: the fear of
three enemies. I think Ihde’s fear of agreeing with hard technological determinism, utopian and
dystopian views leads him to a reactionary position about the ethics of technology. This means that his
postphenomenology has this capacity to establish at least a minimalistic ethics of technology by calling

50

. See (Selinger, 2006) in which Selinger’s, Thompson’s, and Verbeek’s articles evaluate Ihde’s postphenomenology
from the normative perspective.
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on the increase/decrease structure of technology. Technologies increase our capacities by introducing
new relationships between us and the world. Even though they are the cause of some environmental
pollution, they could solve parts of these issues too. Both nuclear bombs and vaccines are examples of
technologies. In this context, we must think about the increase/decrease structure of them. Can this
point lead us to an account of consequentialism? My answer is “yes” if we make a distinction between
two accounts of consequentialism, namely rule consequentialism and act consequentialism. In
summary, according to rule consequentialism, the moral righteousness of an act depends on the
consequences of a rule, but the act consequentialism claims that the moral qualities of an act depends
on the consequences of that act. Does Ihde’s postphenomenology introduce an act account of
consequentialism by focusing on the increase/decrease structure of technologies? The answer to this
question depends on a new picture of the ethics of technology in Ihde’s postphenomenology and a clear
distinction between it and technological determinism and technological utopism and dystopism.

6.2.5. The Meaning and Justification of the Practical Turn

Ihde sees the “practical turn”, the account I discussed in Sections 1 and 2, as a condition of possibility
for postphenomenology. His presupposition is that we live in a “practical turn” paradigm. In this
context, we may ask, “why is Descartes’ subjectivism wrong? Why must not we ask about the
distinction between is and ought? Why should we not ask about the epistemological justification of
postphenomenology? And so on. His answer is that these topics are connected to the “theoretical
paradigm” which was dominant before the paradigm of the “practical turn”. Ihde thinks that the
theoretical paradigm is the wrong direction in the history of philosophy and believes that the history of
philosophy has been based on theory and not praxis. Ihde (1994) sometimes regards this theory–
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oriented trend as Platonism (pp. 34-36).51 According to Ihde (1991a), the political and scientific
situations of the 20th century created the conditions of this turning point (p. 5). I have two kinds of
questions regarding this distinction in Ihde’s philosophy. One is regarding the meaning of this “practical
turn” and the other is related to the justification of it.
What I understand from the “practical turn”, is that it is based on Heidegger's famous distinction
between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit. As I showed in this paper, Ihde (1979) clearly develops this
distinction. However, when he adds other conts such as paradigm shift, revolution, and normal, an
analytical deficiency happens, he is not successful in elaborating them carefully. These terms and their
instances were left in his writings without detailed descriptions. For example, he mentioned that
analytical philosophy and phenomenology are the revolutions of the twentieth century, however, we
cannot know whether they are two distinct paradigms in the history of philosophy or they are two subparadigms which exist beneath one paradigm (pp. xv-xviii). Specifically, I cannot know whether the
“practical turn” is a paradigm or an instance under another paradigm.
Ihde (1990) speaks about the paradigm of the “practical turn” in the history of philosophy. This
approach divides the history of philosophy into two periods: theory–oriented and praxis–oriented.
These two lifeworlds have different norms, criteria and rules which constitute their own knowledge.
Knowledge wholly depends on its context and there is no criterion for comparing two views. There are
many different intellectual schools and approaches in a paradigm but there is only one school that
imposes its norms (p. 27).52 I can ask about the reasons for the priority of practice over theory. Is the
practical turn justified only because we live in the new paradigm? Is there any reasonable criterion we
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. See (Ihde, 1979, pp. 5-8).
. In addition, see (Ihde, 1979, p. xv).
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can evaluate these paradigms comparatively? Why must we accept the “practical turn”? Why is it clear
that the “practical turn” is normatively justified?
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